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The technique of child analysis, insofar as it is special at all, derives from one very simple 
fact: that the adult is – at least to a considerable degree – a mature and independent being, 
while the child is immature and dependent. It is evident that to deal with such different 
subjects the method cannot remain the same. 
Anna Freud, 1926, p. 5 
   
CAROLYN LAUBENDER … 
 
In the foreword to a 1925 text on juvenile delinquency by August Aichhorn titled 
Wayward Youth, Sigmund Freud introduces the importance of Aichhorn’s work by hailing ‘the 
child’ as the future of psychoanalysis. As Freud writes,  
Of all the fields in which psychoanalysis has been applied none has aroused so 
much interest, inspired so much hope, and accordingly attracted so many capable 
workers as the theory and practice of child training. …The child has become the 
main object of psychoanalysis research and in this respect has replaced the 
neurotic(Freud, 1925, p. v) 
 
Noting the interest in and wide appeal of the ‘application’ of psychoanalysis to pedagogy, Freud 
concludes that the child has in fact become the ‘main object of psychoanalysis’ itself, effectively 
displacing – or replacing – the neurotic. In this foreword, Freud famously refers to 
psychoanalysis as a ‘re-education,’ or translated more accurately an ‘after-education,’ suggesting 
that an adult analysis is the necessary supplement to the child’s primary schooling (Freud, 1925, 
p. vii).
1
 While these prefatory remarks are intended as a commentary on Aichhorn’s work with 
‘wayward youth,’ Freud’s observation about the growing importance of the child for 
psychoanalysis writ large registers his more general recognition of the emerging body of work 
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 The original German term, Nacherziehung, is first translated throughout Sigmund Freud’s work as ‘re-
education’; however, the editors of the Standard Edition note that this is a substantial mistranslation since 
‘nach’ conveys a temporal element, an ‘after’-ness, rather than a repetition.  
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produced by socially-minded psychoanalytic reformers, such as Anna Freud, Siegfried Bernfeld, 
Willi Hoffer, and Hermine Hug-Hellmuth, all of whom put the child at the center of their 
psychoanalytic agendas. If the child had become the main object of psychoanalytic inquiry, then 
it seems hardly incidental that one of the most famous child psychoanalysts was in fact Freud’s 
own child, Anna Freud, who was born the same year as psychoanalysis and, from the first, 
counted herself as its sibling, its ‘twin.’ 
 This article analyzes the political stakes of the child psychoanalysis that Sigmund Freud 
heralded by reading Anna Freud’s clinical papers on child analytic technique. If the child was to 
be the future of an international institution, profession, and practice, then how exactly was this 
future tied to and delimited by the political landscape of the time? Insofar as the question of 
authority becomes a keynote concern for Anna Freud in her theories about children’s 
subjectivity, to what extent are these theories consolidating explicitly political concerns about 
power, authority, and governance in interwar Europe? In other words, how might Anna Freud’s 
early clinical technique with children speak not only to the uncertain future of psychoanalysis, 
but also to larger national anxieties about the decline of monarchial empire and the rise of 
multiple national democracies and republics, including the Republik Österreich, the First 
Austrian Republic? 
To address these questions, I begin by situating Anna Freud and her early work within the 
social and intellectual climate of interwar Vienna. Anna Freud’s interest in education and 
children put her in conversation with a number of social and political reformers and radicals and 
it was in the context of these explicitly politicized mobilizations of psychoanalysis that Anna 
Freud’s first iterations of child psychoanalysis were conceived. As I discuss, Anna Freud’s 
adaptation of psychoanalysis for children was founded on a developmental theory of childhood, 
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one that hinges on her postulation that the child’s superego is undeveloped and therefore object-
dependent. Anna Freud’s clinical technique reflected this surmise about the child’s fundamental 
dependence in the way her technique stressed the importance of authority; Anna Freud redefined 
the analyst’s function as both analytic and pedagogical. Focusing on the importance Anna Freud 
accorded to authority in the clinic, I contend that this interwar consideration of the legitimate and 
justifiable place of authority in the clinic participates in a broader historical conversation about 
the uncertain function of authority in democratic politics. Far from being removed from the 
socio-political order, Anna Freud’s clinical writings affirm that the psychoanalytic clinic is 
always already in conversation with the historical context in which it is embedded. 
 
Psycho-Politics: Child Analysis and Social Reform 
By the time Wayward Youth was published in 1925, Anna Freud had already been 
qualified as a psychoanalyst in the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society for three years and was hard at 
work developing a specific psychoanalytic technique for the analysis of children, an approach 
she would describe in detail a year later in An Introduction to the Technique of Child Analysis 
(1926). Although she had first trained as a teacher, Anna Freud’s professional trajectory 
eventually returned her to her psychoanalytic twin and, along with Melanie Klein and Hermine 
Hug-Hellmuth, she became one of the first practicing child psychoanalysts.
2
 Not insignificantly, 
1925 was also the same year that child analyst Melanie Klein gave a weeklong series of lectures 
on child psychoanalysis to the British Psychoanalytic Society at the request of the society’s 
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 Hug-Hellmuth was the first child psychoanalyst and her pedagogical aspirations were not dissimilar to 
Anna Freud’s. However, Hug-Hellmuth’s early death (she was murdered by her nephew in 1924) meant 
that most of her papers were destroyed per the specifications of her will. Consequently, much less has 
been written about her than has been about Anna Freud and Melanie Klein. For further reading see: 
‘Introduction’ and ‘The Origins of Child Analysis’ in Holder (2005); and Geissmann and Geissmann 
(1998). You can’t make note-bubbles in footnotes, but is there a reason to keep some chapter 
specifications for texts but not others (i.e. the ref to Holder, but not to Geissmann and Geissmann)?  
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president, Ernest Jones. Thus, child analysis was already an active subspecialty the year Sigmund 
Freud wrote his forward to Aichhorn’s work and it was being pioneered, importantly, by a 
coterie of rising women analysts who contributed to a growing interest in the analysis of female 
sexuality, maternity, and childhood. Woman-focused child analysis would only gain in 
popularity and importance in the decades to come (especially in England), a fact clearly 
evidenced when, in the years immediately after Freud’s death, the entire institutional future of 
psychoanalysis in Britain hinged on the heated debates between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein.
3
  
While not active in political movements per se, Anna Freud’s work with children put her 
in collaboration with many political liberals, leftists, and social(ist) reformers.
4
 In Vienna after 
World War I, progressives (both liberal and Marxist alike) increasingly turned their attention to 
the prophylactic protection of children through the liberalization of prior educational repression 
and lobbied for the reorganization of many social institutions, including primary schools, 
churches, prisons, universities, government regulations, sexual mores, and gender conventions. 
Many of these reformers, like Maria Montessori (whom Anna Freud greatly admired), looked to 
children’s education as an exemplary site where the liberalization of oppressive strictures could 
facilitate large-scale political transformations and they often incorporated psychoanalytic 
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 Although in many ways the professional conflict between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein culminated in 
the so-called ‘Controversial Discussions’ (1941-46) held by the British Psychoanalytical Society (BPaS), 
their disagreements with one another spanned decades. As early as 1927, Klein and other notable British 
analysts were already leveling substantial (and often vitriolic) critiques at Anna Freud’s first book at a 
symposium organized by Ernest Jones. Anna Freud responded with biting dismissals of her own, and the 
differences between their interpretations of Freudian theory eventually resulted in an ironically named 
‘gentleman’s agreement’ between the two women that split the BPaS definitively into two different 
professional trainings (plus a ‘middle’ or ‘independent’ group that worked between the two). While they 
were collegial professionally, they never arrived at anything like theoretical or personal resolution and the 
fundamental differences between their approaches still shape psychoanalytic institutes today. For further 
reading on this conflict, see King and Steiner (1991). For an excellent social analysis, see Rose (1993) 
and Phillips’s response (Phillips, 2001). Britzman (2003) also has an excellent analysis of the central role 
that education played in these debates.  
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 For information about Anna Freud’s political affiliations, see Young-Bruehl, 2008, 177-78. 
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insights into their social and political agendas. Reflecting retrospectively on the historical 
development of child psychoanalysis, Anna Freud commented in an interview in 1970 on the 
importance of this interwar political situation for the advent of child analysis:  
There is no doubt that child analysis began as a subspecialty of psychoanalysis, in 
the period after the First World War when several such subspecialties were 
initiated. What was later known under the slogan of the ‘widening scope of 
psychoanalysis’ were the attempts made from the 1920s onward to apply the 
therapeutic technique devised for adult neurotics to other ages or to other types of 
mental disorder. (A. Freud, 1970, p. 209) 
 
In response to the new kinds of trauma experienced by returning soldiers, and no doubt also to 
the dramatic political reorganization of Europe that followed the close of World War I, inter-
bellum psychoanalysis modified and adapted its clinical techniques and theoretical insights to 
address the needs of not just individuals but mass populations.
5
 ‘Our dream was the dream of 
psychoanalysis – all it had to offer,’ reflects Anna Freud, ‘not only individuals, but schools and 
universities and hospitals and the courts and “reform schools” that worked with “delinquents”, 
and social service agencies’ (in Coles, 1992, p. 152).  Anna Freud counted child analyses 
amongst these many interwar subspecialties, thinking of it as one of many attempts to expand 
psychoanalysis’s purview beyond the limited scope of neurosis. 
Many of these offshoots of psychoanalysis – including child analysis – were more than 
just a simple ‘application’ of psychoanalysis, however. Indeed, they often radically transformed 
the nature of previous psychoanalytic knowledge on which they were based, explicitly extending 
and modifying psychoanalytic orthodoxy in accordance with specific social and political ideals. 
1920s Vienna witnessed a flowering of such psychoanalytically informed reformers: while 
August Aichhorn tried to liberalize juvenile delinquency homes, Wilhelm Reich sought to undo 
the pernicious effects of repressive hetero-patriarchal capitalism with mobile clinics, free 
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contraceptives, and different forms of touch therapy. Although the ‘psychologization’ of politics 
had been a popular mode of political theorizing since the late nineteenth century – consider, for 
example, Gabriel Tarde’s Les Lois de l'Imitation (1890) or Gustave Le Bon’s Psychologie des 
Foules (1895) – the advent of psychoanalysis and publication of some of Sigmund Freud’s more 
explicitly political work during the interwar period (Group Psychology and the Analysis of the 
Ego (1921); Civilizations and Its Discontents (1930)) only strengthened a widespread 
understanding of socio-political life as thoroughly bound up with personal psychologies. As Eli 
Zaretsky confirms in his social and cultural history of psychoanalysis, Secrets of the Soul:  
In contrast to those that had propounded the classical liberal separation of public 
and private life, the thinkers of the 1930s recognized the unavoidably 
psychological and cultural character of modern politics, and thus the impossibility 
of separating the problems of democracy from those of personal autonomy, 
gender and sexuality, group identity, and the commodification of everyday life. 
(Zaretsky, 2004, p. 244) 
 
Unsurprisingly, this was the context that produced the first iterations of The Frankfurt School, 
whose members (like Theodor Adorno, Erich Fromm, and Herbert Marcuse) generated powerful 
critiques of capitalism, authoritarianism, and (hetero)normative bourgeois family life. This style 
of psychoanalytically informed political theorizing gained traction in the decades following 
World War II especially, but its origins lie in the same historical mise-en-scene as those of child 
analysis.  
No less than her male colleagues, then, Anna Freud pursued a definitively political 
project when she began her psychoanalytically informed work with children. Together with 
social reformers Willi Hoffer, August Aichhorn and Siegfried Bernfeld, Anna Freud formed a 
weekly study group in the 1920s to discuss the relationship between psychoanalysis and 
pedagogy. In Reading Anna Freud, Nick Midgley observes that this express focus on education 
was part of a larger political movement to use psychoanalytic insights to illuminate not just 
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subjectivity, but more specifically the child’s subjectivity. Children were a cynosure for many 
social and political reformers in the left-leaning ‘Red Vienna.’ As Midgley writes:  
The radical reforms of education – understood as one aspect of a wider child 
welfare program – meant that many of the most idealistic and enthusiastic young 
people in Vienna chose to train as teachers. A significant proportion of these same 
young idealists were naturally attracted to psychoanalysis and wished to bring 
together their interest in educational reform with their enthusiasm for this new 
‘science of the mind,’ which promised to revolutionize the way people thought 
about the psychology of the child. (Midgley, 2013, p. 35) 
 
What Midgley suggests here is that an interest in children’s education was also an interest in the 
explicitly political potential of the child’s mind. If, according to these reformers, individual 
psychology determined much of the shape of social and political organizations and institutions, 
then the careful curation of childhood experiences held the promise of transforming the political 
attachments that solidified in adulthood. Attending to the wellbeing of the child was the first step 
in engineering a specific political future.  
 This political bent to Anna Freud’s work with children has most often been recognized in 
her expansive postwar institutional work with children.
6
 But, as I argue here, Anna Freud’s 
clinical, as much as her social, work participates in this political discourse about governmentality 
and democracy, albeit in more obviously ambivalent ways. In what follows, I analyze Anna 
Freud’s interwar clinical writings, which I argue advance an ethics of authority that complicates 
the nature of the democratic implications of her work. If, as Stewart-Steinberg has argued, Anna 
Freud’s postwar institutional work with children in group homes testifies to her experimental 
production of horizontal, democratic power relations, then her interwar clinical technique 
reveals a different theory of democracy by attesting to a belief in the indispensability of 
hierarchical authority, especially as represented by the superego. Throughout these interwar 
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writings, Anna Freud frets about the necessity of authority in the clinic, ultimately resolving that 
the child legitimately requires authoritative guidance since the dismantling of authority would 
only ever result in the loosing of murderous and sexual instincts, instincts that are antithetical to 
the reproduction of a stable and non-violent civil society. Contra socialist liberationist theorists 
like Wilhelm Reich or Herbert Marcuse who narrated the genesis of social malaise as a result of 
unnecessary repressions by the superego (classically represented by the patriarchal Oedipal 
father), Anna Freud instead focused her clinical energies on the cultivation of precisely this 
psychic ‘institution,’ imagining the child to be developmentally ‘immature’ and ‘dependent’ and 
therefore in need of external (analytic) authority.
7
  
By homing in on the way Anna Freud’s early work theorizes the child and clinical 
technique, my aim is thus not to dismiss her clinical work as somehow an ‘inauthentic’ or 
‘failed’ version of psychoanalysis, but rather to expand the reach of historical and political 
readings of psychoanalysis by proposing that clinical methods, as much as public outreach, are 
enabled by and experimentally speak back to available political vocabularies. With a unique 
emphasis on authority, Anna Freud’s interwar work in the clinic participated in a broader 
political speculation about the shortcomings of democracy and the extent to which a 
consolidating authority was democracy’s necessary supplement.  
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 Whereas Sigmund Freud had referred to the three entities in his second topography – the id, the ego, and 
the superego – as “agencies” [instanz], Anna Freud interestingly refers to them as ‘institutions’ 
throughout her writings, both in English and in German. This is an interesting modification of Freud’s 
original nomenclature since it corresponds to Anna Freud’s principally institutional role in 
psychoanalysis: not only did she herself run a number of children’s institutes, but after Sigmund Freud’s 
death she was also responsible for much of the institutionalization of psychoanalysis itself, both in Britain 
and in the United States.  
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The Developing Child: Anna Freud, the Child, and the Superego 
 
Although the first generation of child psychoanalysts worked and taught in roughly the 
same historical contexts and geographical locations – pre-World War II Vienna to wartime and 
postwar London – their theories of the child were often worlds apart.8 Each individual analyst 
developed highly particular theories about what kind of being ‘the child’ was and, consequently, 
each crafted unique clinical techniques tailored to the specificity of the child-mind, as they 
variously understood it. Anna Freud, for instance, advanced a generally developmental 
understanding of subjectivity that focused on the ego and the superego as the metric for 
childhood development. The child was essentially an ‘incomplete’ version of the adult subject 
since, in her view, children lacked stable egos and solidified superegos, both of which were 
precipitated by the successful resolution of the Oedipus complex. Because Anna Freud was 
utilizing the developmental stages inherent in the Oedipus complex, the chronological age of a 
child was of great importance to her theories of psychic life. Categories like ‘infant,’ ‘child,’ 
‘adolescent,’ and ‘adult’ were meaningful ways of marking psychic difference. She maintained 
that infants are primarily auto-erotic with little interest in or awareness of the specificity of the 
objects in their world so long as their instincts are satisfied. According to this model, as the child 
ages it slowly begins to incorporate its external world through a process of identification, 
building its ego and superego from the composite images of the authorities around it. Anna Freud 
affirms this in ‘Child Analysis and the Upbringing of Children’ (1926), an early essay from her 
book on clinical technique, in which she defines the child vis-à-vis the more ‘developed’ adult:  
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 For general histories of ‘the child’ and childhood, see Aries (1965) much contested history of childhood 
or the more recent Cunningham (1995). For more specific and local analyses, see Hendrick (1997); 
Shuttleworth (2010); Steedman (1995); and Castañeda (2002). For a psychoanalytically-focused 
comparative analysis of the different versions of childhood presented by Anna Freud and Melanie Klein, 
respective to Western modernity, see Bar-Haim (forthcoming, 2017). 
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[T]he superego of an adult individual has become the representative of the moral 
demands made by the society in which he lives… what was originally a personal 
obligation felt toward the parents becomes, in the course of development, an ego 
ideal that is independent of its prototypes in the external world.  
 In the case of a child, however, there is as yet no such independence. 
Detachment from the first love objects still lies in the future, and identification 
with them is accomplished only gradually and piecemeal. Even though the 
superego already exists and interacts with the ego at this early period much as it 
does in later times, its dependence on the objects to which it owes it existence 
must not be overlooked… (A. Freud, 1926, pp. 54-55, emphasis added) 
 
This passage merits pause because of how it (unexpectedly) cites object-dependence as a 
hallmark of childhood. Here, Anna Freud purports that children’s psyches are different from 
adults’ in key structural ways: they lack an independent, internalized superego, relying instead 
on the structural authority provided by the outside world (though figures like parents, teachers, 
and, as I shall discuss, analysts). For Anna Freud, the superego crystalizes developmentally as 
the child passes through the sequences of the Oedipus complex and slowly internalizes 
‘authorities’ that had previously been only external. Because of this developmental rubric, Anna 
Freud surmises that the child lacks a consolidated internal authority and is thus fundamentally 
bound to and dependent upon external authorities.  
Of pivotal importance here is the recognition that Anna Freud measures the child’s 
development – its maturity – according to the status of the superego, that internal representative 
of external authority. Freud continues: ‘insofar as the childish superego has not yet become the 
impersonal representative of the demands taken over from the outer world, and is still 
organically connected with it – to that extent the relevant external objects play an important role 
in the analysis itself’ (A. Freud, 1926, p. 58). The inchoate nature of the child’s superego means 
that the child itself is dependent on its external objects, objects that (as I will discuss) she 
explicitly defines as representing ‘authority.’  
 11 
I am highlighting this language of object-dependency within Anna Freud’s work, 
especially insofar as it relates to the metapsychological genesis of the superego, because it 
productively disrupts the rote juxtaposition of Anna Freud’s ‘instinct theory’ with Melanie 
Klein’s ‘object relations.’ In the most reductive characterization of these two positions, Anna 
Freud’s emphasis on the instincts and primary narcissism means that her theory of the child is 
rather insensible to the primacy of particular objects in the infant’s and child’s psychic life; in 
contrast, as the originator of object relations psychoanalysis, Melanie Klein is said to downgrade 
the biological imperatives of the instincts and privilege instead the originary importance of 
external objects. Rough though this sketch certainly is, it captures something of how, as a result 
of the Controversial Discussions in the 1940s, ‘the instinct’ has been retrospectively 
counterpoised to ‘the object’ as representatives of two diametrically opposed schools of thought.  
But while this narrative does speak to certain differences of emphasis within their 
respective oeuvres, it dramatically reduces the complexity of each, foreclosing a recognition of 
the unusual role that object dependency plays in Anna Freud’s work, on the one hand, and the 
vast swaths of instinctual, biological phylogenesis that enable Melanie Klein’s systematic 
thought, on the other. Although Klein does maintain throughout her life that the child’s external 
environment and object relations matter even in its earliest psychic life, the extent to which she 
relies on biological theories of instincts and phylogenetically transmitted object representations 
seriously complicates (and, in fact, diminishes) the role that the external world plays in the 
psychic drama of Klein’s child. For Klein, far more than Anna Freud, the child’s primary 
organizing conflict is between the “life instinct” and the “death instinct.”11 Klein insists that the 
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in English).  
 
 12 
child’s experience of object relations in the external world is always colored by its relations to 
objects in its internal world, where objects are the psychic representatives of instincts. For Klein, 
the child comes into the world with an instinctual world of its own; its mind is prepopulated by 
phantasies that stem from somatic origins and instinctual inheritances.
12 Klein’s account of the 
child’s unconscious phantasy—a concept central to her unique theory of subjectivity—is (d)riven 
by the body’s instincts and their vicissitudes.  
 
   
‘Allowing Her ‘Devil’ to Speak’:  Anna Freud and The Analyst’s Authority in the Clinic 
 
Anna Freud’s understanding of the developing child as a psychologically immature and 
therefore externally dependent organism is reflected in her proposition of two significant (and 
connected) modifications of Sigmund Freud’s ‘classical’ psychoanalytic technique. First, 
because of the unique circumstances of child analysis, Anna Freud argues that the child analyst 
needs to cultivate a specifically positive transference in the child patient. Whereas a defining 
aspect of psychoanalytic technique with adult patients is the transference wherein patients 
transpose past desires and anxieties, loves and hates, onto the person of the analyst, Anna Freud 
claims that, because the child is still very much attached to and dependent on the presence of the 
actual parents themselves, the possibilities for any full-bodied transference are strictly limited. 
Explaining this in ‘The Role of Transference in the Analysis of Children’ in Four Lectures on 
Child Analysis, she observed:  
Unlike the adult, the child is not ready to produce a new edition of his love 
relationships, because, as one might say, the old edition is not yet exhausted. His 
                                                        
12 ‘Even the quite small child,’ writes Klein, ‘which seemingly knows nothing about birth, has a very 
distinct unconscious knowledge of the fact that children grow in the mother’s womb’ (Klein, 1927, p. 
173). Endowed with this unconscious, instinctual knowledge, children ‘represent symbolically phantasies, 
wishes and experiences [in their play]. Here they are employing the same phylogenetically acquired mode 
of expression as we are familiar with from dreams’ (Klein, 1926, pg.134). 
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original objects, the parents, are still real and present as love objects… there is no 
necessity for the child to put the analyst fully in the parents’ place, since 
compared to them he has not the same advantages which the adult finds when he 
can exchange his fantasy objects for a real person. (A. Freud, 1926, p. 45) 
 
Children, in other words, are creatures caught in the thrall of their everyday environments. 
Because of this, the child analyst must actively court the child’s affection. ‘I take great pains,’ 
she writes, ‘to establish in the child a strong attachment to myself, and to bring him into a 
relationship of dependence on me… This affectionate attachment, i.e., the positive transference 
to the analyst, becomes the prerequisite for all later analytic work’ (A. Freud 1926, p. 40). These 
‘great pains,’ which the child analyst takes to secure the child’s dependence, recall Anna Freud’s 
previous descriptions of the child’s necessary dependence on its external authorities because of 
its ineffectual superego. What she implies here is that the analyst’s clinical project is to aid the 
child in the introjection of a superego by, in fact, becoming the child’s ego-ideal – the child’s 
ideal authority. This is, as she once wrote, an indispensible ‘period of preparation – a period of 
“breaking the child in” for analysis…’  (A. Freud, 1926, p. 7). For Anna Freud, the child analyst 
ought to buttress the parents’ authoritative position, using love and affection to encourage the 
child to develop socially acceptable sublimations and repressions. In contrast to her father who 
theorized the superego – the psychic representative of social authority – as a precipitate of 
anxiety and guilt, Anna Freud here implicitly posits the possibility of a less conflicted superego, 
one founded on un-ambivalent love and presence rather than anxiety and loss. ‘The really fruitful 
work,’ she summarizes, ‘always takes place in positive attachment’ (A. Freud, 1926, p. 41).14  
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 Although never a terribly popular analyst in London – she became well known as a ‘difficult’ person 
and was described by Ernest Jones in a letter to Melanie Klein in 1942 as a ‘tough and indigestible 
morsel’ – Anna Freud’s uncompromising advocacy of the child’s positive transference garnered special 
criticism (Young-Bruehl, 2008, 259). Her position was attacked for a wide range of reasons: her 
adversaries contested everything from the ‘unpsychoanalytic’ nature of her technique to the ‘unanalyzed’ 
aspects of her own person in order to dismiss her theory. She would eventually come to revise this 
emphasis on a necessarily positive transference, claiming in the 1970s and 1980s that her early work had 
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 To elaborate this postulate about the positive transference, Anna Freud narrates the case 
of a ten-year-old boy in which she actively curates the boy’s dependence, using her own 
authority to secure his attachment to her. This boy, who presented clinically with ‘an obscure 
mixture of many anxieties, nervous states, insincerities, and infantile perverse habits,’ distrusted 
Anna Freud from the outset and refused to disclose his ‘sexual secrets’ (A. Freud, 1926, p. 11). 
In answer to this suspicion, she embarks on a subtle process of one-upmanship, matching each of 
the boy’s actions and behaviors with superior versions of her own:  
If he came with a string in his pocket, and began to show me remarkable knots 
and tricks, I would let him see that I could make more complicated knots and do 
more remarkable tricks. If he made faces, I pulled better ones; if he challenged me 
to trials of strength, I showed myself incomparably stronger. (A. Freud, 1926, p. 
12) 
 
Anna Freud’s aim in performing this repertoire of herculean feats is to make herself ‘useful’ to 
the boy precisely by establishing herself as an authority on the subjects in which he is interested. 
She endeavors to show herself ‘incomparably stronger’ so as to gain his trust, bringing him to 
rely on her as an authority capable of shielding him from punishment and mitigating his 
destructive onslaughts. Anna Freud continues:  
Besides an interesting and useful companion I had become a very powerful 
person, without whose help he could no longer get along. […] I had made myself 
indispensable to him and he had become dependent on me. But I had only waited 
for this moment to demand of him in return the most extensive cooperation, 
though not in words and not all at one stroke: I asked for the surrender, so 
necessary for analysis, of all his previously guarded secrets… (A. Freud, 1926, 
pp. 13-14) 
 
 By encouraging the boy’s positive attachment and dependence, Anna Freud had in effect 
become an authority without whom he could no longer make do. Love and authority here work 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
unduly privileged the child’s affectionate (rather than hostile) feelings. However, even with this late-
coming codicil, the cultivation of a positive transference is still a hallmark of Anna Freud’s overall 
technique. For an example of this revised position, see the ‘Introduction’ to Volume I of The Writings of 
Anna Freud (1926, pp. vii-xii).   
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together to produce the conditions that she believes to be the necessary groundwork for any 
further analytic work. ‘[T]he child analyst, who in any case is bigger and older than his little 
patient […] becomes a person of unquestioned power when the child feels that his authority is 
accepted by the parents even above their own’ (A. Freud, 1926, pp. 22-23). What this positive 
transference to an analytic authority yields, according to Anna Freud’s terms, is yet another layer 
of the hierarchal relation: if all goes as planned, the child is then willing to ‘surrender’ to the 
analysis, giving over ‘all his previously guarded secrets’ as the final coup-de-grace to the 
analyst’s authority.  
While a positive transference is the first key modification that Anna Freud suggests for 
child analysis, the second – already suggested by the above case study – is that the analyst be a 
pedagogical authority for the child-patient. Anna Freud imagines the child analyst’s function to 
be quite different from the passive ‘mirror’ that Sigmund Freud had proposed for analysts 
working with adults. ‘The child analyst must be anything but a shadow,’ she cautions (A. Freud, 
1926, p. 45).
15
 According to her advice, analysts should not simply act as passive reflectors of 
unconscious material since the young child suffers not from reminiscences, but from current 
events. Given the fact that the child is actively negotiating the often-conflicted process of turning 
an external authority into an internal structure, Anna Freud avers that the analyst ought to 
provide ‘support’ throughout this process, helping the child to construct stable psychic structures 
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 Anna Freud’s reference to the analyst as ‘shadow’ calls to mind Sigmund Freud’s use of the same term 
in ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ (1917). In describing the psychic effects of loss for the melancholic, 
Sigmund Freud writes enigmatically that the ‘shadow of the object fell upon the ego’ leaving its trace 
upon the ego’s structure. While shadows, like mirrors, are in some sense doubles –  they are a derivative 
outline of a primary, ‘authentic’ object – they differently connote concepts of light and obstruction. 
Whereas mirrors are the surface onto which reflections of the object are cast, representing the object in 
ostensibly perfect detail, shadows are the result of the object’s obstruction of light. They are the ‘dark 
side,’ so to speak, produced by an object’s embodied placement in relation to a light source. Rather than a 
doubled presence, they index an absence. Anna Freud’s use of this term thus already speaks to how she 
understands the child analyst in terms of presence and absence rather than doubled reflection.  
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through the authority of her presence, rather than prompting them to deconstruct solidified ones 
through transference and interpretation. Like a teacher or parent, the child analyst must mete out 
freedom with due discipline.  
To give another brief example of the authority she promotes in the analyst, Anna Freud 
explains her analytic technique in ‘Child Analysis and the Upbringing of Children’ by recounting 
her clinical work with a six-year-old girl who was brought to analysis because of an obsessional 
neurosis, which resulted in an overly inhibited demeanor.
16
 Anna Freud interprets this inhibition 
as indicating a repression of the girl’s hostile and sadistic feelings against her mother, which the 
girl had split off into another part of her personality, calling this her ‘devil.’ By initially allowing 
the child to express these feelings without censure in the clinic, Anna Freud ‘brought [her] young 
obsessional patient to the point of allowing her ‘devil’ to speak,’ a change that transformed not 
only the way the child behaved in the analytic hour, but also her personality at home (A. Freud, 
1926, p. 61). However, the tentative license that Anna Freud gave her young patient did not at all 
go as she had planned. Having lifted the girl’s external prohibitions and restrictions, she 
summarizes the results: 
In the absence of external condemnation, the child lost all moderation, carried 
over into her home all the ideas previously expressed only during analysis, and 
                                                        
16
 Although I do not have the space to discuss it at length here, another interesting instance of the place of 
authority in Anna Freud’s clinic can be found in her first psychoanalytic paper, ‘Beating Fantasies and 
Daydreams’ (1922). In that paper, Anna Freud discusses an adolescent girl who is plagued by what she 
calls her ‘nice stories,’ that is pre-modern narratives about a sinister knight and his capture and 
confinement of a male youth. Tracing the evolution of these political parables from earlier beating 
fantasies between teachers and boys, Anna Freud repeatedly emphasizes that what the two scenes share is 
an ‘antagonism between a strong and a weak person’ (148). In other words, both scenes traffic in the 
dissemination of (patriarchal) authority from adults to children. This co-incidence of authority in the 
clinic is then only compounded by the fact that, as most scholars recognize, the young girl in question – 
that anonymous ‘patient’ who found sexual satisfaction in the paternal subjection of children to 
pedagogical discipline – is none other than the progenitor of a clinical technique of child analysis that 
promotes the generational exercise of pedagogical authority as its most defining feature. If the knight in 
Anna Freud’s eroticized daydream intends to torture the youth for his guarded secrets, then what are 
readers to make of Anna Freud’s clinical desire to use her own authority to extract sexual secrets from her 
own child-patients? 
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completely reveled, as she had with me, in her anal preoccupations, comparisons, 
and expressions… My little patient had behaved like a pervert or a mentally ill 
adult, and thereby put herself beyond the pale of society. Since she was not 
removed from the company of others, they removed themselves from her. During 
this period she abandoned all restraints in other respects as well. In a few days she 
had become transformed into a cheerful, insolent, and disobedient child, by no 
means dissatisfied with herself. (A. Freud, 1926, p. 62) 
 
Using morally weighted language, Anna Freud reflects that she ‘had changed an inhibited, 
obsessional child into one whose “perverse” tendencies were liberated,’ casting her ‘beyond the 
pale of society’ (1926, 63). The way Anna Freud interprets the little girl’s abandonment of all 
social decorum is used as proof that children do not possess stable, self-regulating superegos and 
thus require the exercise of external authority if they are going to become other than a Hobbesian 
subject in the state of nature. For Anna Freud, this was a revelatory moment in the development 
of her analytic technique and it solidified her conviction that children need not only to be treated 
by different methods than adults, but that authority in particular is a critical element for any 
successful child analysis:  
I had to acknowledge that I had made a mistake, in crediting the child’s superego 
with an independent inhibitory strength which it did not possess. As soon as the 
important people in the external world had relaxed their demands, the child’s 
superego, previously strict and strong enough to bring forth a whole series of 
obsessional symptoms, suddenly turned compliant… I had changed an inhibited, 
obsessional girl into one whose ‘perverse’ tendencies were liberated. But, in 
doing so, I had also ruined the situation for my work. This liberated child now had 
her ‘rest hour’ all day long, lost her enthusiasm for our joint work to a 
considerable degree… (A. Freud, 1926, p. 63) 
 
As a corrective to what she considered this early misstep in the analysis, Anna Freud 
subsequently assumes a much more authoritative relation to the child and reinstates many of the 
original expressive prohibitions, especially those that related to the child’s behavior outside of 
the clinic. Notes Anna Freud: ‘I fulfilled her apparent desire to have authoritative demands 
imposed on her’ (A. Freud ,1926, p. 19). Anna Freud justifies her superegoic, authoritative 
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intervention by (re)turning to an explicitly pedagogical idiom, emphasizing the importance of 
analytic ‘guid[ance]’ and children’s ‘learn[ing].’ She opines further, in the same lecture: 
The analyst must claim for himself the liberty to guide the child at this important 
point, in order to secure, to some extent, the achievements of analysis. Under his 
influence the child must learn how to deal with his instinctual life; the analyst’s 
views must in the end determine what part of the infantile sexual impulses must 
be suppressed or rejected as unsuitable in civilized society… (A. Freud, 1926, p. 
60) 
 
Here, it is the analyst’s job to ‘civilize’ the (presumably ‘savage’) child, taking what liberties she 
must in order to ‘guide’ and ‘influence’ the child toward the proper sublimations. Placing the 
analyst’s authority on the side of civilization, Anna Freud likens the child analyst to a teacher or 
leader, whose ability to produce civil society is conditional on their authoritative suppression of 
unruly masses. Anna Freud thus uses this case, which itself raises the question of the analyst’s 
potentially pedagogical and disciplinary function, as a pedagogical object lesson for the reader, 
showcasing the moral failures of an undisciplined heroine – both the child given too free a rein, 
and herself as an initially too-lenient analyst.  
 This case occupies an important place within Anna Freud’s early lectures since, through 
it, she justifies the implementation of the preparatory period in child analysis, which she (as 
much as her many critics) acknowledges to be thoroughly unanalytic. She returns to the case 
frequently throughout her writings and uses it to argue that such pedagogical measures are not 
just necessary in this one particular case, but are also a vital component in all child analyses. As 
Anna Freud continually makes explicit, because of the undeveloped nature of the child’s mind it 
is incumbent on the child analyst to be simultaneously psychoanalytic and pedagogical; the child 
analyst must negotiate an unwieldy balance between the exercise of authority and its critique. As 
she states a few pages later in the same lecture,  
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I would not have enlarged upon this example if it did not serve to illustrate all the 
characteristics of the analysis of children put forward in this last section: the fact 
that a child’s superego is weak; that his superego demands and consequently his 
neurosis are dependent upon the external world; that the child himself is incapable 
of controlling the instincts that have been freed; and that for this reason the 
analyst must take charge and guide them. The analyst accordingly combines in 
his own person two difficult and diametrically opposed functions: he has to 
analyze and educate, that is to say, in the same breath he must allow and forbid, 
loosen and bind again. If the analyst does not succeed in this, analysis may 
become the child’s charter for all the ill conduct prohibited in society. (A. Freud, 
1926, p. 65, emphasis added)  
 
Avowing the oppositional nature of these two pursuits – education and psychoanalysis – Anna 
Freud nevertheless frames the technical uniqueness of child psychoanalysis as its almost 
impossible combination of them. The child’s willingness and ability to conform to social 
expectations (primarily those having to do with sexuality and aggression) is a key part of how 
Anna Freud narrates the ‘normal development’ – that is, the ‘healthy development’ – of the 
child, whose instinctual self-satisfactions must be tempered by cultural restrictions that are 
imposed as much by the authority of the analyst as by that of the forbidding teacher. In the 
pedagogical exercise of authority, the analyst, like the teacher, is a ‘real’ person for the child, an 
external authority on which the child’s superego can lean as a crutch: ‘[t]he educational 
implications which, as you will hear, are involved in the analysis, result in the child knowing 
very well just what seems desirable or undesirable to the analyst, and what he sanctions or 
disapproves of’ (1926, 46). In this way, Anna Freud puts this case to work to prove the 
exceptional and unorthodox authority that the child analyst must assume with children in order to 
avoid the collapse of culture altogether.  
Although this appreciation of authority has much in common with Sigmund Freud’s 
Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego and his later Civilization and Its Discontents, it is 
important to recall that Anna Freud (unlike her father) advanced this ethics of authority, 
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guidance, and external support specifically in relation to the child in the clinic. While Sigmund 
Freud, in Group Psychology, described the social organization of groups and leaders through his 
theory of identification, which he argues is the means by which the child introjects his father as 
his first authority, Anna Freud adopted this social hypothesis as her clinical premise, prescribing 
it to the children she analyzed. In a letter to family friend Max Eitingon the same year that she 
delivered these lectures (1926), Anna Freud confessed her personal attachment to her father’s 
Group Psychology, telling Eitingon: ‘…everything was in there, my old daydreams and all I 
wanted.’ Group Psychology functioned for Anna Freud as the authoritative text about authority. 
Her project, as she articulates it, is not one of speculative social theorization but of clinical 
construction and creation. Anna Freud therefore took her father’s political theory with its 
emphasis on the need for social authority and suggested that the subjects most in need of this 
particular kind of governance were children in analysis.
17
 In her own terms, Anna Freud argues 
that the child analyst’s function ought to be the (necessarily prescriptive) production of 
subjectivity through the careful orchestration of authority:  
We may say in short: the analyst must succeed in putting himself in the place of 
the child’s ego ideal for that duration of the analysis; he ought not to begin his 
analytic work of liberation until he has made sure that the child is eager to follow 
his lead. For this purpose, it is essential that the analyst have the position of 
authority about which we spoke at the beginning. Before the child can give the 
highest place in his emotional life, that of the ego ideal, to this new love objects 
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 Read from a wider historical angle, Group Psychology is a rather politically over-determined text. 
Ironically, while Anna Freud’s clinical method borrowed from this text, so too, according to Mark 
Edmundson, may have an up-and-coming Adolf Hitler. Edmundson (2007) records that ‘Hitler’s 
biographer, John Toland, speculates that Hitler may have read Group Psychology and used it to guide his 
[political] performances’ and public speeches (Edmundson, 2007, p. 56). Whether or not we take this 
historical conjecture as an accurate representation of Hitler’s literary habits is hardly the point since 
Toland’s inclination to even speculate on this possibility registers the text’s strong conceptual resonance 
with the dynamics of political authority, in this case, authoritarianism. This, at the same time as socialist 
radical Wilhelm Reich used Freud’s writing on mass psychology as the premise for The Mass Psychology 
of Fascism (1933). Unlike Reich, Anna Freud did not mobilize the premises offered in Group Psychology 
for a social diagnosis, but adopted them as the prescripts for her own professional undertaking, imagining 
her version of democratic subjectivity on and through the reproduction of (patriarchal) authority. 
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which ranks with the parents, he needs to feel that analyst’s authority is even 
greater than theirs. (A. Freud, 1926, p. 60; emphasis added) 
 
Knowing how the psychic life of an adult ought to be structured in order to minimize suffering, 
Anna Freud propounds a technique that seeks to lead children toward specific ends. To this end, 
Anna Freud maintains that psychoanalysis – and psychoanalysts – ought to encourage children to 
as much as possible bring their instinctual needs under the guiding authority of the ego and 
superego; the analyst’s work is about using her or his authority to transform socially 
unacceptable instinctual urges into what she or he understands to be socially useful and 
gratifiable ones, thereby reproducing stable, ‘civilized’ society. Anna Freud said as much in the 
late decades of her career, after the human and material destructions of World War II, in the 
lecture series she gave in Boston for Harvard and Radcliffe students. In a talk titled ‘The 
Unconscious’ (1952), she advised that ‘to change the environment of the child so that it fits the 
nature of the child… is all wrong. It does not work out well for the child, and for the adult 
community it means a loss in cultural values. It is the child who should go forward into the 
community’ (Sandler, p. 6). According to Anna Freud, radical social transformation was not the 
purview of psychoanalysis.
18
 The particular forms of government, and the political relations 
contained therein, that Anna Freud was able to imagine were delimited by the consolidated 
norms of culture and community. Anna Freud’s theories about clinical technique suggest the 
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 While Anna Freud did seek, throughout her postwar career, to accommodate displaced children, these 
group homes were never organized with the conscious intention of transforming family structures; rather, 
they sought to reduce, as much as possible, the changes forced by the exigencies of total war and the 
damage wrought by genocidal National Socialism. Their project was compensatory far more than it was 
progressive; Anna Freud sought stability, not revolution. Indeed, these homes very often tried to 
reproduce internally the same conditions of liberal (heteronormative) family life as Anna Freud imagined 
the child would have experienced in her own family by creating institutional ‘mothers’ and ‘fathers’ and 
Anna Freud frequently went out of her way to ensure biologically male authorities were present. For 
further reading, See A. Freud, 1973, especially ‘Introduction of the Mother Relationship Into Nursery 
Life’ and ‘The Role of the Father in the Residential Nursery’ in Part II.  
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productive significance of the wider, socio-political order for the organization of individual 
psychic life insomuch as the socio-political order both provides the conceptual idioms through 
which analysts theorize subjectivity and insomuch as it sets the perimeters of the social world to 
which the patient will be asked to conform. 
 
Follow the Leader: On Authority and Democracy 
In the psychoanalytic consulting room, child analysts like Anna Freud were actively 
(re)creating and implementing revised clinical techniques to manage the child-subject, as they 
understood it. These techniques, and indeed the very narratives they used to define ‘the child’ as 
a particular kind of subjectivity, often pulled from the explicitly political vocabularies available 
to them. Terms like ‘authority,’ ‘liberation,’ ‘leadership,’ ‘attack,’ ‘defense,’ ‘tyranny,’ and 
‘reparation’ (to mention but a few) were a regular part of the rhetoric analysts used to theorize 
the child-subject’s metapsychology and legitimate a clinical technique. Take, for instance, Anna 
Freud’s brief description of the ego from her landmark 1936 The Ego and the Mechanisms of 
Defense in which she mobilizes politicized rhetoric to elaborate psychic structures: 
the proper field for observation is always the ego. It is, so to speak, the medium 
through which we try to get a picture of the other two institutions. When the 
relations between the two neighboring powers – ego and id – are peaceful, the 
former fulfills to admiration its role of observing the latter. (A. Freud, 1936, p. 6) 
 
Using language that registers the regulatory, institutional social structures that were the condition 
of possibility for Anna Freud’s conception of the ego, readers might also note the clearly 
political idioms informing her conception of the (international) ‘relations’ between these 
‘neighboring powers.’ Poised on the brink of World War II, Anna Freud argues in 1936 that the 
goal of analysis is negotiating ‘peace’ between these conflicted institutions, the ego and the id, 
whose personification as nation-states begs the question of their respective political signification. 
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The geopolitical underpinnings of this metapsychology are far from novel, though, given that 
Sigmund Freud had been marshaling war imagery in his psychoanalytic papers from the very 
start.
19
 Indeed, the fact that Anna Freud’s most enduring clinical legacy has been an unrelenting 
focus on the analysis of ego ‘defenses’ already speaks to a lifetime spent caught between two 
world wars, a career embroiled in a major intra-institutional struggle for political power, and a 
subjectivity entrenched in racialized and gendered limitations. Psychoanalysts, as much as many 
other human scientists, were developing their conception of the child subject in the midst of a 
larger political discourse that was, newly, thinking about government and (inter)national conflict 
on global scales. 
As I have been arguing, what is interesting about Anna Freud’s early work is the extent to 
which the clinical technique she develops turns to the operation of authority as the solution for 
the problems introduced by the ‘undeveloped’ and ‘immature’ child-mind. For the child, unlike 
the adult, the liberatory potential of psychoanalysis is to be found precisely in the judicious 
embodiment and exercise of authority. This treatment of authority represented a significant break 
with the thought of her various socialist colleagues who, largely, wanted to de-emphasize the 
censures of the superego, since this rigid and repressive internal authority was understood to be 
the root of much unnecessary psychical conflict. As the sweeping political appeal of 
authoritarianism was made more and more evident throughout the 1930s and 1940s, thinkers like 
Marcuse, Fromm, and Adorno grew increasingly wary of the psychic effects of authority and, as 
a tactical response to this zealotry, they theorized authoritarianism as the political correlate of the 
psychic introjection of authority. Citing Fromm specifically, Frank Furedi observes in his 
comprehensive survey of social theories of authority that there was an increasing tendency 
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 For a reading of the political dimensions of Freud’s deployment of war metaphors and imagery, see 
Brunner (2001).   
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(throughout the interwar period, but during the rise of European fascism, especially) ‘to lose 
sight of the distinction between authority and power, and between terms like “authority” and 
“authoritarian”’ (2013, 362). In many interwar social and political discourses, authority and 
authoritarianism became synonymous; an emphasis on the former translated into a natural 
affinity for the latter. As the threat of multiple authoritarian regimes mounted in the 1930s, 
psychoanalytic rubrics that detailed the individual internalization of authority became powerful 
narratives for diagnosing the appeal of authoritarianism as a form of governance and for 
strategizing different kinds of social eugenics to stymie its recurrence.
20
    
In contrast to these thinkers, who equated authority with authoritarianism and sought to 
retrench the hold of the superego as the internal representative of oppressive political authority, 
Anna Freud interestingly propounded a clinical technique in which children’s ‘liberation’ (as she 
put it) was contingent on the successful internalization of precisely this internal authority – the 
superego. By combining pedagogical with psychoanalytic methods in the clinic, Anna Freud 
argues emphatically for the necessity of restrictive authority in the upbringing – and analysis – of 
the child. When it comes to the child in the clinic, freedom paradoxically comes from obedience, 
authority, and analytic leadership. As Midgley confirms, ‘[i]n contrast to the dominant view of 
psychoanalysis at the time, which many people understood to be promoting unfettered freedom 
of expression, Freud emphasized that “lack of restraint” can be as harmful to children as “the 
injurious effect of too great repression”’ (2013, p. 48). Put simply, Anna Freud’s primary 
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 Although D.W. Winnicott is not particularly concerned with authority, on the topic of social eugenics 
we might think here of the many postwar BBC public broadcasts that he gave in which he counseled 
mothers on the best techniques for infant management, making explicit that successful childcare was the 
unequivocal foundation for a democratic polis. For an example of this tendency in Winnicott’s work, see 
‘The Mother’s Contribution to Society’ in Home Is Where We Start From (1990). For critical analyses of 
the historical and political implications of Winnicott’s postwar work, see Riley (1983); Gerson (2005) and 
(2004); and Alexander (2013) and (2016).  
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concern in these early papers was not with mitigating the injurious effects of too strong an 
authority, but with curtailing those begat by too great a freedom.  
Yet Anna Freud was not alone in her conceptual turn to authority as a strategic solution 
for the problems incurred by excessive ungoverned liberty. While socialist anti-authoritarians on 
the cusp of World War II were highly critical of authority, emblazing it as the antithesis of 
(democratic) freedom, there was a large sect of European interwar intellectuals who were wary 
of democratic tenets and embraced instead a concept of authority as a potential solution to the 
problems inherent in pure democracies. After World War I ended and the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire was dismantled and partitioned into smaller, ethnic nation-states, the newly minted 
Austria struggled to articulate the legitimacy of its constitutional foundations (Caldwell, 1997, p. 
92). In the abrupt transition from monarchial empire to democratic republic, many (both leftists 
and conservatives) were ambivalent about not only the republic’s legitimacy, but also about its 
desirability. When it came to Austria specifically, all three of the largest political parties at the 
time – The Christian Social Party The Social Democrats, and the Greater German Nationals –  
had doubts about a liberal Austrian democracy: the conservative Christian Social Party would 
have preferred a traditionalist return to monarchy; the Social Democrats were amenable to 
democracy, but lobbied for a more fully socialist economy; and the German Nationals avidly 
vied for official unification with Germany (Jelavich, 1987, p. 170).
21
 Popular sentiment in 
                                                        
21
 Although interwar Austria’s political parties are typically described in this three ‘camp’ (Lager) model, 
this partitioning can misrepresent some of the major similarities across the different parties (Wasserman, 
2014, 8-9). For instance, the majority of Austrians across the political spectrum (not just German 
Nationals) strongly desired an Anschluss with Germany. Moreover, while Christian Socials were vocal in 
their anti-democratic claims for an ethnically unified, traditionalist state, they were far from the only ones 
to nostalgically lament the loss of the monarchy. Indeed, many artists, intellectuals, and leftists likewise 
longed for the monarchy after its abrupt decline. Such a desire was hardly a badge of conservatism since, 
as the minoritized Jewish population especially realized, many liberal social and political protections had 
been more securely guaranteed under Franz Joseph’s progressive rule than under that of nascent 
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Austria prior to World War II was thus more than a little skeptical of democratic republicanism, 
with a majority of the population expressing open hostility about the Allies’ ideological project 
of enforced democratization. For many interwar Austrians and Germans, the imperative to build 
democracy had the strong smell of cultural imperialism and its premises of majority rule often 
appeared as a threat rather than a promise. As Furedi speculates, it has perhaps only been 
retrospectively, after the disastrous effects of the twin authoritarian regimes of Stalinism and 
National Socialism, that democracy has come to be so idealized, enshrined as a broadly 
uncontested ethico-political virtue (2013, p. 351). However, prior to the psychic and material 
violence of genocidal fascist and socialist regimes, democracy was treated with much more 
ambivalence, in large part because its relationship to authority was ambiguous.
22
  
Harkening back to the crowd psychologists of decades before, this negative suspicion 
about the lack of legitimate, regulatory authority in democratic governments frequently took the 
form of a widespread anxiety about the irrational nature of ‘public opinion’ and the deficiencies 
of the ungoverned ‘masses.’ Conservative political commentators distrusted the sound decision 
making of the public majority, likening them to ‘children’ and ‘primitives’ in a developmental 
framework reminiscent of Sigmund Freud’s anthropological epic, Totem and Taboo (1914). 
Writes American commentator Walter Lippmann in his 1922 critique of democracy, Public 
Opinion:  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
democracy. For an analysis of the representation of the Habsburg monarchy after its decline, see 
Kożuchowski (2013). 
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 In an interesting twist to the skepticism about democracy, the rise of authoritarian governments 
throughout Europe was then cited as an additional proof of democracy’s failures. Hungarian sociologist 
Karl Mannheim elaborated this position in 1933 when he wrote in ‘The Democratization of Culture’ that 
‘[d]ictatorships can only arise in democracies… Dictatorship is not the antithesis of democracy; it 
represents one of the possible ways in which a democratic society may try to resolve its problems’  (Cited 
in Furedi, 2013, p. 353).  
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The mass of absolutely illiterate, of feeble-minded, grossly neurotic, 
undernourished and frustrated individuals, is very considerable, much more 
considerable there is reason to think than we generally suppose. Thus a wide 
popular appeal is circulated among persons who are mentally children or 
barbarians, people whose lives are a morass of entanglements, people whose 
vitality is exhausted, shut-in people, and people whose experience has 
comprehended no factor in the problem under discussion. (Lippmann, 1922, p. 
68) 
 
Lippmann here interestingly compares the psychological sophistication of the masses, whom he 
imagines are politically untrustworthy because of their susceptibility to uninformed public 
opinion, with children and ‘barbarians,’ categories of subjectivity that he (like Anna Freud) 
implicitly assumes are in need of authoritative guidance. For Lippmann, authority was far from a 
threat to democracy; rather, it was democracy’s solution, the necessary supplement to a system 
internally flawed.  
In a similar fashion, albeit from a much more progressive angle, Max Weber’s interest in 
charismatic authority as an antidote to the deadening effects of routinized bureaucracy expresses 
a similar reinvestment in the political purchase of authority. Working against the hegemonic 
ascent of modernity, with its values of rationalism, secularism, capitalism, and professionalism – 
a historical movement Weber felicitously called ‘disenchantment’ – Weber (re)turned to a theory 
of charismatic authority. Although Weber did not argue for the appeal of authority in these 
terms, this interest in the importance of a ‘natural’ leader capable of bestowing order and unity 
speaks to an anxiety about the tenability of mass democracy. While Weber argued for the 
democratization of Germany during the war and after its resolution, he importantly understood 
democracy in terms of leadership, with an unvarnished emphasis on the extent to which the 
condition of possibility of any political state is force, violence, and domination. As Weber 
observes with a bleak realism in 1919: ‘the state is a relation of men dominating men, a relation 
supported by means of legitimate (i.e. considered to be legitimate) violence. If the state is to 
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exist, the dominated must obey the authority claimed by the powers that be’ (1946, p. 78). For 
Weber, the complementary element of any constitutional democracy was a charismatic authority, 
a leader whose qualified authority ensured the productive curtailment of majority rule. Only 
through the dissemination of charismatic authority could a true ‘leadership democracy’ be 
established. Thus, during World War I and the interwar years, Weber (and others) looked 
increasingly to political fantasies of the ascension of authority and the constructive 
recombination of authority and democracy as a potential solution to the problems raised by 
majority rule and the uncertain legitimacy of the new constitution during the abrupt transition 
from empire to democratic republic.
23
  
Certainly, Anna Freud never consciously or explicitly endorsed these political views and 
none of these critics were ever centrally involved in the inner circles of psychoanalytic practice 
and theorizing. My point here is not to suggest otherwise. However, I do want to mark out a 
certain rhetorical similarity between interwar critiques of democracy that promoted authority as a 
necessary supplement – or out-and-out solution – to democracy and Anna Freud’s interwar 
theories of child technique, which anxiously testified to the indispensability of analytic authority 
for governing the child’s unruly instincts. The contested place that authority occupied in debates 
about democracy in the interwar period helps contextualize the complex political signification of 
authority in Anna Freud’s clinic. Understood in this context, we can read Anna Freud’s focus on 
authority not as a rejection of democracy, but rather as indexing an anxious struggle about the 
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 For an interesting additional example of this discourse about democracy in Austria, specifically, 
Richard von Kralik, the conservative historian, author, and intellectual, hailed what he called a ‘true 
democracy.’ ‘True democracy… comprises the whole people and all its social groups [Ständen] with the 
monarch as the head of the social body… All true culture is Volkskultur’ (qtd in Wasserman, 2014). Part 
authoritarian, part monarchist, part Germanic anti-Semite, Kralik was one of the leading intellectuals in 
Vienna during the interwar period, a station made clear by the number and intensity of reproofs that Karl 
Kraus directed at his work. He, as much as Weber, sought to redefine democracy through the 
implementation of a stronger central authority.  
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relationship between political authority and democracy itself. A turn toward authority carries 
with it a critique of the inadequacies of liberal democracy, yes, but it is also intended as a 
supplemental solution to that problem rather than rejection of it. As Anna Freud imagines it, the 
analyst’s job – much like a Periclean figure – is to impose a hierarchal authority as, 
paradoxically, the best means for constructing democratic civil society. In this interwar work, 
authority interestingly becomes the solution to – rather than antagonist of – the lack of order and 
guidance characteristic of democracies. Thus, while it is my contention that Anna Freud’s 
vocabulary of clinical leadership and authority speaks to a thoroughly political discourse 
underwriting Anna Freud’s clinical project, I mean this argument to suggest a complication of 
her relation to democracy, one that was a keynote in the interwar anxieties about the rapidly 
transforming forms of government in Europe. If Anna Freud’s interwar clinical techniques 
meditated on ‘good’ authority, then this was as a supplement to, rather than a wholesale 
dismissal of, the uncertain political futures of democracy.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
This article provides a reading of a ‘political Anna Freud’ by analyzing how Anna Freud’s 
interwar papers about the clinical technique of child analysis refracted broader political 
discourses about the function and effects of governmental authority. I claim that, in the interwar 
period, Anna Freud developed a version of child analysis explicitly interested in the authority the 
analyst exercised over the child-patient. By working from a developmental conception of the 
child, Anna Freud argued that the relatively ‘undeveloped’ and ‘immature’ nature of the child’s 
superego made it ‘dependent’ on a ballast of external (analytic) authority. Anna Freud theorized 
this analytic authority as a corollary to pedagogical authority, a discourse that puts her in 
conversation with many political reformers of her time. Yet, unlike her more leftist colleagues, 
when it came to the clinic Anna Freud contended that authority was both practically necessary 
and psychically beneficial for children. As I show, this emphasis on the necessity of authority in 
the clinic is part of a larger, political conversation throughout interwar Europe about the status of 
newly minted national democracies like Austria’s. While recent scholarship on Anna Freud has 
mined her postwar, institutional work for a latent democratic ethos, I attend to how her early, 
specifically clinical prioritization of authority participates in a broader interwar ambivalence 
about the political viability of democracy and about the ultimate need for the restoration of good 
authority.  
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